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The major trends shaping the current evolution ofthe U.S. financial
system conflict with an outmoded legal and regulatory framework.
Reform ofthat framework is needed to promote an efficient and stable
financial system. Specifically, reforms are needed in the deposit insur-
ance system, bank powers, and the large-dollar, electronic payments
system.
This paper was originally presented at a Federal Reserve System
Management Conference held April 1987.
Shaped by the interaction of economic, tech-
nological, legal, and regulatory forces, the U.S.
financial system is undergoing signficant change.
During the next five to ten years, it increasingly will
be characterized by:
• reliance on primary securities markets, with a
diminishing role for traditional bank-provided
intermediation;
• institutional realignment of functions in the
provision of financial services, including clear-
ing and settlement;
• expanded access to the payments system; and
• geographic integration, including international-
ization of financial activity, with around-the-
clock trading and settlement.
The present legal and regulatory structure often
conflicts with fundamental economic and tech-
nological forces. Moreover, the piecemeal efforts to
resolve these conflicts and to accommodate market
forces have resulted in several undesirable con-
sequences. First, financial change is occurring
through the exploitation of legal and regulatory
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loopholes rather than in a manner that ensures the
evolution ofan efficient financial system. The pro-
liferation of new instrum~nts, the transfer of tradi-
tional banking activity to nonbanks, and the stag-
gering volume of daily payments activity, for
example, may be as much a result ofefforts to avoid
regulation as a response to fundamental economic
needs.
Second, although partial integration of financial
activities and offinancial and commercial activities
is occurring, the important issues ofhow to reform
the federal safety net and how far to extend its
coverage are not being resolved. Third, as activity
shifts to international financial centers and less-
regulated nonbank firms, domestic banking firms
are left with a diminishing proportion of overall
financial activity.
The legal and regulatory framework should be
reformed to accommodate market-driven forces for
change. However, such reform also must be consis-
tent with the goal of preserving financial stability.
These criteria imply that federal supervision, reg-
ulation, and protection of the financial system
should be structured and conducted in a way that
promotes stability while limitingtheperverse incen-
tives for risk-taking and the possibility of large
government expenditures that government interven-
tion can create. In this paper, I presume that limited
government guarantees, directed at payments bal-
ances and savings balances held by depositories, aredesirable. The optimal extent and structure ofsuch
guarantees, however, are issues that are addressed,
but not resolved, in the paper.
The purpose ofthis paper is to provide a concep-
tual framework for both understanding the changes
occurring in the financial system and analyzing the
policy implications of those changes. The paper is
organizedas follows: in SectionI, the economic and
regulatory forces thataredrivingthe evolutionofthe
financial system are described. Then the major
emerging trends are outlined in Section II. Finally,
the policy implications ofthese changes are consid-
ered in Section III. The paper concludes in Section
IV that policymakers should focus on reforming
three key areas: the federal safety net, bank powers,
and the payments system.
I. Forces for Change
The changes that are likely to take place in the
U.S. financial system are the result of the interac-
tion of ba'iic economic forces with regulatory and
legal constraints. In some cases, the economic
forces will overwhelm these constraints; in other
cases, regulatory and legal forces will dominate.
Economic Forces
The following primary economic forces appearto
be at work today. First, electronic information pro-
cessingis reducing the costofgathering, managing,
and transmitting the data required to produce finan-
cial services. This trend not only makes it possible
to provide certain traditional financial services at
reduced cost butmakes new financial services feasi-
ble, thereby altering ways of raising and investing
funds. Moreover, the effect oftechnological change
is amplified by the rising demand for time-saving
innovations, such as certain integrated financial
services, and devices that improve access to retail
funds balances, such as ATMs and point-of-sale
terminals.
Second, the growth in wealth and the level of
commercial activity worldwide is increasing the
number, size, and complexity of transactions in
financial markets. The changing nature of transac-
tions, in turn, is stimulating the demand for sophis-
ticated financial services.
Third, greater volatility in interest rates,
exchange rates, and asset prices is expanding the
demand for ways to manage risk. Not only is it
increasing reliance on specific risk-management
products, as exemplified by the growth of options
and futures markets, but also the complexity of
traditional financial instruments. Moreover, wide-
spread loan losses in recent years have heightened
the need for risk management and diversification
within institutions.
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Legal and Regulatory Forces
The present financial system has in place exten-
sive legal and regulatory structures to promote the
stability of the banking industry and the payments
mechanismand to facilitate the conductofmonetary
policy. To the extent that these structures conflict
with private economic incentives, the private mar-
ket will attempt to take advantage ofor avoid them.
As a result, oursystemoflaws and regulations itself
is a force for change in financial markets.
The first, and perhaps most important, example is
the effect ofthe federal safety net on bank behavior.
Underpriced deposit protection gives banks and
thrifts incentives to reduce equity capital and to
expand the scope of insurance coverage. Similarly,
nondepository institutions may seek to own deposi-
tory firms in order to raise insured funds.
A second force for change is reserve require-
ments. Ithas been argued that reserve requirements
are needed for monetary policy purposes. Yet the
requirement to hold noninterest-earning reserves
against transactions deposits, together with the pro-
hibition on the payment of explicit interest on
demand deposits, provides incentives to create
functionally similar instruments, such as overnight
RPs, that arbitrarily increase activity in the pay-
ments system.
A third regulatory force for change is the system
oflegal restrictions on the ownership and powers of
banking firms, which is particularly cumbersome at
a time when nonbanking firms are expanding
rapidly into the provisionofmany banking services.
Geographic restrictions facing banking firms also
are affecting industry structure by shifting activity
away from traditional banks.
Fourth, payments system policies affect not only
the level ofrisk in the payments system but also thestructure of the financial services industry. The
absence ofreal-time settlement and mechanisms to
price intraday credit extended by the Federal
Reserve arguablycontribute to the level ofpayments
system risk. The exclusion of nondepository firms
from access to the payments system may be induc-
ing commercial enterprises to buy depository
institutions in order to gain the access they desire.
Finally, regulatory, tax, and other policies vary
across countries (and in some instances, states) even
for the same class ofinstitution. These international
(and interstate) differences affect not only the locus
offinancial activity, but also the ability of anyone
governmentoragency to pursue policies that ensure
prudent practices in the financial system. However,
the recently proposed agreement between U.S. and
British banking authorities is an important step in
the attempt to internationalize supervision and reg-
ulation.
II. Emerging Trends
Several key trends are emerging from the eco-
nomic, technological, regulatory, and legal forces
affecting the U.S. financial system. These include
trends toward direct placement and securitization,
functional realignment in the provision of financial
services, expanded access to the payments system,
and geographic integration offinancial services and
markets. They are described below.
Direct Placement and Securitization
Increasingly, borrowers are placing debt
securities directly with investors and relying corre-
spondingly less on traditional financial intermedi-
aries - most notably, commercial banks as a
source offunds. This rise in direct placement is the
outcome of a number of underlying economic
forces, as well as constraints, imposed by the cur-
rent financial regulatory framework. Growth in the
sheer size oftransactions, together with the declin-
ing costs of transmitting credit information and
effecting transactions, have made direct placement
cost-effective for an increasing number of transac-
tions.
Historically, banks have enjoyed cost-advantages
in evaluating a given borrower's creditworthiness
and in taking on interest rate, liquidity, and credit
risks. As a result, financial intermediation through
the use oftwo instruments- adeposit liability and
a loan asset - with the bank as a party to each has
been more economical than direct dealings between
borrowers and investors. Today, however, banks'
cost-advantages in executing intermediation func-
tions are diminishing. The decliningcostoftechnol-
ogy permits the sale ofcredit information by various
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rating services and, in one sense, even by banks
themselves through the issuance of standby letters
ofcredit. The effects ofdeclining information costs
are especially evident in the shrinking share oflarge
and middle-market corporate borrowers that con-
tinue to rely on banks as their primary source of
funds. More of these borrowers now obtain
Moody's or Standard and Poors' ratings in conjunc-
tion with standby letter ofcredit backing to enable
them to raise funds directly in the commercial paper
and bond markets.
In addition, the rapidly growing depth and liquid-
ity of futures and options markets enable investors
to manage interest-rate risk inexpensively and
directly, thereby reducing the relative cost advan-
tage that banks traditionally have enjoyed. Sim-
ilarly, secondary markets for a broadening array of
primary securities provide a growing source of
liquidity which, in the past, only banks were able to
provide economically. Finally, pension funds, tax-
sheltered savings plans, and money market and
bond mutual funds now offer numerous channels to
satisfy the diverse denomination requirements of
borrowers and investors. In fact, money market
mutual funds continue to hold over $250 billion in
assets even though banks no longer are subject to
interest-rate ceilings on most deposit products. As a
result of these developments, financial market par-
ticipants can now purchase in relatively small
denominations - their desired mix of liquidity,
credit, and interest-rate risks directly, without hav-
ing to tum to the banking system in the traditional
sense.
In addition to the economic forces favoring directplacement, regulatory constraints continue to make
intermediation by depositories less attractive than
otherwise. Reserve requirements, in particular, raise
the cost of attracting reservable funds. Moreover,
the decision of bank regulators in recent years to
require banks to maintain higher minimum (book)
capital-to-asset ratios probably is raising the effec-
tive cost ofholding assets in portfolio. With under-
priced deposit insurance, it generally has been more
profitable for banks to raise insured deposits than to
raise capital to fund loans.
As a result of these economic forces and regula-
tory constraints, banks increasingly have been shift-
ing to so-called off-balance-sheet activities. In
recent years, for example, banks have offered
standby letters of credit (for a fee) to back debt
securities ofprime issuers rather than funding loans
to those issuers. By assuming these contingent
liabilities, banks can increase their effective lever-
age without actually violating formal capital
requirements. In effect, the implicit government
protection of large institutions encourages their
entry into the growing market for financial guaran-
tees. Approximately 15 percent of all commercial
paper and 29 percent of newly issued municipal
bonds now have some form offinancial guarantee as
backing. l
Because banks retain some comparative advan-
tages in evaluating the creditworthiness of smaller
businesses and households as well as in servicing
debt obligations, they continue to originate loans
but are selling and then servicing an increasing
number of them. Similarly, banks are "securitiz-
ing" loans (that is, pooling and using them as
security for marketable debt instruments that are
sold outright to investors). In addition to residential
mortgage loans, which were first securitized in
1968, commercial mortgages, automobile finance
loans, and credit card receivables are also being
securitized now. For many of these products, the
rate ofgrowth ofthe derivative security far exceeds
the growth rate ofthe underlying asset. For exam-
ple, residential mortgage backed securities grew by
155 percentoverthe pastfive years, while real estate
loans in bank and thrift portfolios grew by only 24
percent. 2
Clearly, the trend is forbanks to take on the role of
broker, oreven underwriter, to facilitate transactions
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in the primary market. However, banks still will
function as traditional intermediaries, as most will
continue to hold loans in portfolio, particularly
loans to borrowers whose creditworthiness is rela-
tively costly for the market to evaluate or whose
funding needs are not standard.
Functional Realignment
Economic forces such as the demand for greater
convenience in financial services, the declining cost
ofeffecting transactions, and the growth ofsecuriti-
zation and direct placement are causing a break-
down in institutional specialization. Commercial
banks, thrift institutions, securities firms, insurance
companies, and other types of financial and nonfi-
nancial companies increasingly are offering prod-
ucts thatoverlap theirtraditional markets. Although
these developments do not necessarily portend full-
scale integration of financial service firms, they do
suggestthat the old institutional boundaries'govern-
ing firms' activities are breaking down and that a
realignment of the types of services each firm
chooses to provide is taking place.
For wholesale commercial banks and investment
banks serving the needs ofthe corporate sector, this
process of realignment is especially apparent. For
commercial banks, the push towards investment
banking is a logical extension of their expertise in
lending as their corporate borrowers rely more and
more on direct placement. By the same token,
investment banks believe that their ability to offer
certain commercial banking services would be
advantageous. For example, investment bankswant
to be able to offer payments services and to settle
transactions directly because doing so themselves is
more efficient and profitable than obtaining the
same services from commercial banks.3
So far, nonbank firms have been more successful
at circumventing barriers than have commercial
banks simply because they are regulated less exten-
sively. Technically, regulatory and legal restrictions
on the ownership of commercial banks prevent
nonbank firms from offering banking services.
However, .through such innovations as checkable
money market mutual funds and cash management-
type sweep accounts, nonbank firms now offer
services that are functionally similar to commercialbanks' payments and deposit services. Moreover,
with the expansion of thrift institutions' lending,
payments, and deposit-taking powers, the owner-
ship ofnonbank firms (which is not restricted in the
same way as commercial bank ownership) confers
many banking powers. Likewise, the innovation of
nonbankbanks, which skirt the legal definition ofa
commercial bank by offering only commercial
loans or demand deposit services but not both, will
enable nonbankfirms suchas Merrill Lynchto offer
banking services.
While nondepository firms are now able to offer
virtuallythefull range ofbankingservices- albeit,
less efficiently than through outright ownership of
commercial banks - banks are trying to broaden
their nonbanking activities. To a certain extent,
regulators are accommodating these pressures.
Bank regulators have expanded permissible
activities to include credit-related insurance, dis-
count brokerage, (limited) securities underwriting,
data processing, financial planning, and investment
advisory services. Moreover, regulators now sanc-
tion bank holding companies' purchases of failing
thrift institutions, thereby expanding the oppor-
tunities for those banking organizations.
Forthe most part, regulatory accommodation still
does not allow banks the degree of freedom that
nonbank firms have. In particular, commercial
banks are prevented from underwriting the vast
majority ofmunicipal debt and all domestic corpo-
rate debt and equities. Where they are not as con-
strained by Glass-Steagall restrictions, large com-
mercial banks underwrite a significant and growing
proportion ofsecurities in international capital mar-
kets, including interest rate and currency swaps.
(There are, however, limitations on the amount of
corporate debt and equity underwriting they cando
even in foreign markets.4)
Expanding Access to Payments System
Many ofthe forces that are encouraging realign-
ment in the provision of financial services also are
motivating nonbanks' desire for access to the pay-
ments system. In particular, the increasing integra-
tion of payments and securities activities and the
trend towards direct placement are making direct
access to thepaymentssystemmore valuablethan in
the past. Also, the high and volatile interest rates of
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a few years ago induced corporations and house-
holds to invest in more sophisticated cash manage-
ment technology, whichtheycontinuetouseevenin
the current lower interest rate environment. The use
ofsuch technology makes direct access to the pay-
ments system for the purposes ofconsolidating and
investing idle balances especially attractive. Such
forces are behind brokerages' cash management
accounts and the establishment of nonbank banks
by brokerage firms.
Combined with theseeconomic forces are several
regulatory constraints that encourage the use of
alternatives to bank-provided payments balances.
Noninterest-eaming reserves and the prohibition on
the payment ofexplicit interest on demand deposits
raise the effective cost of using demand deposits to
settle transactions. As a result, corporations in par-
ticular employ cash management techniques that
minimize such balances. Their actions, especially
those related to the overnight RP market, undoubt-
edly are partofthe explanation for the extraordinary
volume of transactions over Fedwire, the Federal
Reserve's electronic funds transfer network.
Nonbank firms traditionally have been denied
directaccess to the payments system in general, and
to Fedwire in particular, because ofconcerns about
increased payments system risk. However, as noted
above, ownership of thrifts and nonbank banks
enables nonbank firms to circumventrestrictions on
access and may, in time, render the current legal
framework governing access to the payments sys-
tem obsolete.
Geographic Integration
The growth ofinternational trade and commerce,
the integration of financial markets and payments
media, and the declining cost of information tech-
nology appear to be increasing the optimal geo-
graphic scope offirms in banking and finance. As a
result, there is a trend towards internationalization
of capital markets and interstate provision of
domestic financial services. Domestic firms ofstat-
ure can now raise funds economically in the rapidly
growing euromarkets. A large California utility, for
example, has at times raised a significant proportion
ofits longer-term funding in the euronote and bond
markets even though its operations are confined
largely to domestic markets.Commercial and investment banking firms are
expanding their international activities not only to
"followtheir customers" but also to take advantage
of international regulatory discrepancies. They
have, for example, been attracted to the London and
Tokyo markets, which recently have loosened
restrictions on the activities ofmarket participants.
At the same time, domestic restrictions also are
pushing U.S. financial institutions overseas.
Restrictions on commercial banks' securities under-
writing activities as well as reserve requirements
and deposit-rate regulations, for example, have
inducedU.S. banks to shiftbusinessto international
markets where they can avoid domestic regula-
tions.5
The trend towards interstate provision ofdomes-
tic financial services is even more pronounced.6
Banks are seeking to establish regional and even
national deposit-taking networks to broaden and
diversify their core deposit, financial services, and
lending bases and to provide customers engaged in
interstate transactions with improved access to the
payments system. Regulations already have accom-
modated these forces to a large extent, although
perhaps not in the most economical way.
Through holding company subsidiaries, banks
and thrifts now can perform virtually all banking
functions across state lines except deposit-gather-
ing. (With the advent of brokered deposits and
nonbank banks, they are not fully constrained even
in this last area.) Moreover, individual states are
now accommodating interstate entry. Thirty-seven
states have passed legislation permitting entry by
banking firms located outofstate. Eighteen ofthose
states permit, or will soon permit, entry by banks
headquartered anywhere in the country.
III. Implications and Issues
These developments raise a number of public
policy concerns. First, the present approach to reg-
ulation ofthe financial system encourages an ineffi-
cient use of resources. For example, resources are
devoted to discovering and exploiting loopholes in
the current legal and regulatory system. More
importantly, the result of this process is a struc-
turally inefficient financial industry that is charac-
terized by a proliferation ofnew instruments, trans-
fer oftraditional banking activity to nonbanks, and
payments volumes that are excessive in relation to
economic activity.
Second, without deposit insurance reform, the
expansion offinancial activity of banks or the inte-
gration of financial and commercial activities may
lead to an undesirable propagation of the deposit
insurance subsidy. One concern, for example, is that
a stressed nonbank affiliate might draw financial
support from the bank, endanger the bank, and
indirectly be supported by the deposit insurance
fund.
Third, the growth of international financial cen-
ters and of unregulated firms' involvement in the
provision of financial services implies diminished
federal supervisory leverage over financial activity
that may be essential to financial stability. Dimin-
ished supervisory control is particularly trouble-
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some in light of concern about the potential for
undesired or unintended de facto extension of the
federal safety net.
The current legal, regulatory, deposit insurance,
and payments frameworks are. inadequate for
addressing these policy concerns. Reform is needed
to preserve financial stability and to accommodate a
changing financial environment. However, such
reform must balance the benefits from enhancing
stability against the costs. For example, stability
could be enhanced (in the short run) if deposit
insurance were extended to every financial firm.
Absent deposit insurance reform, however, such an
approach would distort risk-taking decisions (or
require a vast expenditure ofsupervisory resources
to prevent the distortion).
Since it is not feasible ordesirable to insure every
firm or activity, we must decide what truly needs to
be protected. Although the extent of insurance
coverage is a subject of intense debate, nearly all
agree that protection of transactions balances
(whether held at commercial banks orat nonbanks)
is essential.7 Also, because many observers are
concerned that a serious contraction in the avail-
ability of intermediated credit from depository
institutions could have destabilizing consequences,
there also is a view that a significant part of allnontransactions balances needs to be protected as
well. 8 At the same time, however, there is the
concern that this protection not extend too far.
Clearly, we must not protect the owners of credit-
granting intermediaries from the consequences of
theirdecisions lest we run the risk ofexcessive risk-
taking on their part.
Although the question of what ought to be pro-
tected has no simple answer, most observers con-
clude that both the payment and credit intermedia-
tion functions of depositories need partial, if not
fairly extensive, protection. Many of the issues
discussed below regarding the structure of the
deposit insurance system, the boundaries of bank
powers, and the operation of the payments system
are predicated on this conclusion. The conclusion
itself, however, is open to debate.
Deposit Insurance and the
Federal Safety Net
Ourpresentdeposit insurance systemactually has
performed remarkably well over the last fifty years.
Although there have been runs on individual banks,
spillover effects have been limited and there have
not been any banking panics at federally insured
institutions. In addition, payouts from insurance
funds were very modest prior to the 1970s.
More recently, however, many observers have
begun to question the viability of the system in the
wake ofa record number ofbank failures, the large
foreign debt exposures of the money center banks,
and the well-publicized problems of the FSLIC.
One can argue that some of the recent problems
stem from an implicit (and at times, explicit) exten-
sion of the federal safety net well beyond the stated
coverage of deposit insurance. One might even say
that the safety net has been spread so thinly it may
soon tear. Moreover, because the current system
relies so heavily on supervision and regulation, it
has become increasingly unable to accommodate
the market forces and trends enumerated above.
The Status Quo
It is now widely recognized that the current
deposit insurancesystemintroduces amoral hazard;
that is, it gives insured institutions an incentive to
take on excessive risk. The combination offlat-rate
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premia unrelated to risk, possible coverage of all
deposit and nondeposit liabilities (at least at large
banks), and a willingness to let insolvent banks and
thrifts continueto operate has seriously undermined
the discipline on that would ottlerWl~;e
be imposed by the market.9
As a result, regulation and supervision bear the
main burden of limiting risk-taking. However,
should the of insurance
continue to expand, the of containing
bank risks with supervision and regulation would
dim and leave the government to underwrite risks
for larger and larger segments of the economy.
Thus, reform of the deposit insurance system is
central to and a prerequisite for financial reform.
Indeed, it may be needed just to deal with the
current economic environment, as exemplified by
the problems ofthe savings and loan industry and its
insurance fund.
Approaches to Reform
There have been many proposals for reforming
the deposit insurance system. Some involve restrict-
ing the explicit or implicit scope of deposit insur-
ance coverage while others seek to "reprice" insur-
ance to reduce the moral hazard problem. Below,
the pros and cons of various alternatives are dis-
cussed.
Reducing the Scope ofDeposit Insurance
Perhaps one ofthe oldest reform proposals dates
back to Henry Simons' 1948 proposal for 100 per-
cent reserve banking as modified by Milton Fried-
man in 1959 to include the payment of interest on
reserves. IO This idea, which in essence has been
revived by Robert Litan and John Kareken among
others, 11 would turn banks into institutions similar
to money market mutual funds that banks'
liabilities would be used to fund safe assets,
such as short-term government securities, cash, and
reserve balances at the Federal Reserve.
If banks were required to back their liabilities
with only "perfectly safe" assets, they could not
fail. Moreover, no restrictions on the ownership of
such "eunuch" banks would be necessary since
there would be no opportunity for the bank tosupport failing nonbank affiliates. (The bank's
deposit liabilities would be used to fund only safe
assets and notto fund any form ofcredit to affiliates,
including intraday payments credit.) Under these
conditions, which imply complete legal and eco-
nomic separation of the bank from nonbank affili-
ates, the failure of a nonbank affiliate could not
impair the bank. Ofcourse, ifbanks held assets that
were "fairly," but not perfectly, safe and were
allowed to extend credit to subsidiaries, or to lend
their"good name" to the subsidiaries in a way that
implied legal liability, then the problems ofcontrol-
ling the risks undertaken by a diversified conglom-
erate would arise.
Implicit in this "safe assets" approach is the
notion thatdepositinsurance shouldprotectonlythe
payments system or payments-related balances. In
fact, under this proposal, meaningful credit inter-
mediation would take place only in uninsured finan-
cial institutions or subsidiaries similar to current-
day banks in most respects except for their inability
to offer insured pure transactions accounts.
Although uninsured intermediaries presumably
would take on fairly conservative risk postures, they
probably would still use short-term liabilities to
fund risky, longer-term loans to some degree and
thus could be subject to problems with depositor
runs. These runs have the potential for destabilizing
the credit system. Thus, although the safe assets
proposal might provide adequate protection for the
payments function ofdepositories, it would offerno
protection for credit intermediation.
Another approach to limiting the scope ofdeposit
insurance focuses on explicitly restricting the
payouts made to depositors to encourage depositor
surveillance of depositories' risk-taking. Tradi-
tionally, the insurance system has restricted payouts
by fully insuring each deposit only up to some
maximum amount. But other approaches could be
taken, such as also explicitly insuring a given per-
centageofdeposits above the maximum amount. Of
course, to be meaningful, maximum insurance
coverage would have to be enforced strictly and
uniformly for all failed banks and "assisted" mer-
gers that expose the insuring agency to losses.
The FDIC's "modified payout" propoool would
work well in this contextifit were applied uniformly
to "purchases and assumptions" as well as to
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"payouts." If this were done, deposits not fully
insured would be subject to an immediate mark-
down and might never be fully repaid. (Under the
experimental modified payout plan, uninsured
qepositors of some closed banks received only a
prorated portion ofthe estimated value ofthe failed
banks' assets immediately. Uninsured depositors of
such failed banks could receive additional payments
if, upon disposal of the assets, the realized value
exceeded the FDIC's estimate. The actual plan,
however, did not shift losses to depositors if a
"failed" bank were handled through a purchase and
assumption.) 12
Increasing depositor surveillance through these
avenues would reduce ex ante risk-taking because
uninsured depositors would require premium rates
for the riskier institutions and the threat ofa run by
depositors would induce institutions to operate pru-
dently. Over time, the level of supervision and
regulation could be scaled back, although there
would be a need for more public information about
the conditionsofbanks. Bothofthese developments
would accommodate the natural evolution of the
financial system. However, the proposal provides
little protection against runs by uninsured deposi-
tors. To the extent that one believes that runs by
uninsured depositors are potentially destabilizing to
the financial system, as apparently was the view of
regulators in the episode involving the failure of
Continental Illinois in 198413, proposals of this
nature do not offer sufficient protection.
In sum, limiting the scope of deposit insurance,
either by limiting the functions of insured institu-
tions or by limiting insured depositcoverage, could
reduce or eliminate the moral hazard implicit in the
current deposit insurance system. However, these
proposals would increase the potential for credit
runs that could destabilize the financial system. An
alternative approach to reform is to maintain fairly
broad insurance coverage of the payments and
credit functions of financial intermediaries while
"repricing" that coverage to reduce the moral haz-
ard.
Repricing Deposit Insurance
The most obvious way to reprice deposit insur-
ance is to charge an insurance premium that riseswith the ex ante risk of the insured institution's
portfolio. This is a sound concept because it would
penalize bank equityholders for excessive risk-tak-
ing and thus would internalize the costs of risk-
taking along with the benefits.
In practice, however, this proposal could prove
extremely difficult to implement because it would
require charging an insurance premium based on
examiners' assessmentsofthe exante marketvalues
and risks of a bank's portfolio of assets, many of
which are not traded or readily marketable, as well
as judgingthe risks and potential profitabilitiesofits
non-portfolio activities. Moreover, to have a signifi-
cant impact on ex ante risk-taking, examiners' risk
assessments would have to look well to the future,
and premia might have to be adjusted fairly dramat-
ically on the basis of subjective risk assessments.
(The FDIC's legislative proposal to double the
annual premiumtoone-sixthofapercentofdeposits
for banks in the high-risk category would not be
sufficient to deter risk-taking.)
A second method of internalizing risk requires
that insured institutions be closed before the market
value of their equity could fall below zero. If this
could be accomplished without error, a closed
institution's assets necessarily would be sufficientto
discharge its liabilities at the time ofliquidation. As
a result, failed (that is, closed) institutions would
not impose losses on the insurance fund. Instead,
bank equityholders would bear the full costs and
benefits oftheirdecisions and would have no incen-
tive to take excessive risks.
Moreover, as long as depositors were confident
thatregulators would be successful inclosing banks
before the market value ofequity became negative,
and thus assure themofprotectionfrom losses, they
would not run on a "troubled"bank. Inthis manner,
it would be possible, in concept, to protect deposits
and prevent runs while simultaneously confining
risk to bank equityholders.
To be effective, however, this approach would
require increases in both the scope and frequency of
federal supervision ofinsured institutions to moni-
tor the market values of their equity closely. One
major practical difficulty in increasing supervision
lies in assigning accurate market values to non-
traded assets and liabilities. Such valuation might
be even more difficult ifbankstook onadded powers
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or acquired commercial firms. Another difficulty is
the lack oflegal authority for the insuring agency to
require chartering agencies promptly to close
institutions deemed insolvent on the basis of a
marketvahle assessment ofequity.
As a result, any practical implementation ofthis
approach would have to allow for errors in closure.
If depositors believed a bank might be closed too
late, would run unless they could
be assured that losses would be covered by a third
party, such as subordinated debt holders and/or the
deposit insurance fund. (To be effective, subordi-
nated debt should be perpetual and subordinated to
both bank deposits and the insurance fund.)
There are other ways ofaccommodating errors in
assessing market values. One would be to give
regulators the authority to err on the safe side either
by closing a bank that might still have a positive
market value of equity or by requiring the bank to
increase its equityJo reduce the risk of ex post
uninsured depositor or insurance fund losses.
Although politically impractical today, yet another
method would be to hold bank equityholders liable
for losses exceeding theiroriginalcapital, as was the
case prior to the 1930s, when stockholders of
nationally chartered banks were liable for losses up
to twice the par value ofthe stock owned.
The implementation ofprompt market-value clo-
sure would raise many political problems,
especiallyduring atransitional period. Forexample,
the closure of institutions that are currently insol-
vent wouldraise majorproblems for the FSLIC, and
possibly even the FDIC. However, these are the very
institutions that now pose the gravest threat to the
insurance funds. Nevertheless, it would be possible
and desirable to move closer to market-value
accounting and closure rules. Moreover, once
insured institutions adjust to a truly unforgiving
closure policy, they would voluntarily hold more
capital in relation to the riskiness oftheir portfolios
to reduce or eliminate the risk of being declared
insolvent.
The current risk-based capital proposal, which
requires banks with more risky assets and off-bal-
ance sheet activities to hold more capital, can be
considered a step in the same direction. Such pro-
posals, however, will succeed in eliminating or
reducing the moral hazard indeposit insurance onlyifthey help to ensure that insured institutions main-
tain a positive market value of capital over a wide
range of possible ex post outcomes. Since riskier
assets have a higher probability of declining in
value, requiring additional capital for these assets ex
ante increases the probability of a positive market
value ex post.
Like a scheme of risk-based deposit insurance
a true risk-based capital approach would
require ex ante estimates of the value and riskiness
ofeach type ofasset as well as its contribution to the
overall riskiness of the portfolio. However, an
approach requiring banks to hold additional capital
(even if based on a fairly crude assessment ofrisk)
probably would be easier to implement and less
likely to generate errors that cause majordistortions
than a system of risk-based deposit insurance pre-
mia.
In sum, there are practical and political problems
with each of the approaches" to insurance reform
described. But if we wish to maintain deposit
insurance coverage that is as extensive as what we
have now, reform is necessary. The optimal
approach probably will involve a blend of reforms.
Bank Powers
At the heart of the conflict between the natural
evolution of the financial system and the legal and
regulatory structure governing that system is the
issue of bank powers. The current restrictions on
bank ownership and powers, enumerated in the
Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts,
stand in the way of the trend towards functional
realignment in the provision of financial services.
While market forces will foster the development of
alternatives to bank-provided payments and credit
services, these alternatives may not be the most
efficient from society's perspective.
Specifically, preservation of the current restric-
tions on bank powers will cause financial activity to
continue to shift away from banks to nonbank
banks, thrifts, and investment banks. This shift
implies botharelative decline in business transacted
by banking firms and a rearrangement of activity
within the corporate structure ofbank holding com-
panies. Failure to resolve the nonbank bank issue
will lead to a decline in the value ofthe traditional
commercial bankcharter, and may even cause bank-
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ing firms to shift activities to nonbank subsidiaries.
In fact, one bank consulting firm has advocated a
corporate restructuring dubbed "double de-bank-
ing" in which the bank holding company relin-
quishes its commercial bank charter in favor of a
nonbank bank charter (to retain payments system
access) while placing all of its other financing,
underwriting, and loan servicing activities in sepa-
rate nonbank subsidiaries. 14
The basic conflict between economic forces and
regulation extends beyond domestic markets. As
activity continues to shift to less-regulated interna-
tional centers, bank regulators will find themselves
regulating and supervising a shrinking share oftotal
financial activity. To the extent that the quality of
supervision deteriorates because ofthe difficulty of
supervising an international banking organization
in its entirety, the stability of the financial system
could be threatened. These challenges to supervi-
sion could be overcome, in part, by coordinating
supervision and regulation in the world's three most
important financial centers - New York, London,
and Tokyo. The U.S.-U.K. risk-based capital pro-
posal is a first step. Nonetheless, because ofrestric-
tions on domestic banking powers, there remain
strong incentives to shift activity toward less regu-
lated environments.
Resolving the bank powers issue requires careful
balancing ofdisparate concerns. On the one hand,
because federal oversight and protection of some
portion of financial activity is essential to stability,
regulation must not be so at odds with market forces
that important financial activities shift away from
federal control. On the other hand, because the
provision of a federal safety net creates incentives
for excessive risk-taking, some minimum level of
regulation, or at least supervision, is necessary.
Separation ofPowers
Before we consider the extent to which bank
powers ought to be expanded in response to market
pressures, itmay be useful toreconsider the original
rationalefor separatingbanking from otherfinancial
services and from commerce. Ofprimary concern to
legislators in the 1930s were the problems associ-
ated with concentration ofresources and the poten-
tial for self-dealing. Such problems have beenaddressed, withvaryingdegreesofsuccess, in other
countries without completely separating banking
and securities markets. IS Moreover, since the
1930s, the problems may have been mitigated to
some extent in the U.S. by SEC regulations and
surveillance. Likewise, antitrust restrictions should
serve to prevent excessive concentration and anti-
competitive behavior. Finally, if greater integration
of financial services were allowed, the concentra-
tion of total financial resources might increase,
whereas the concentration for particular services
actually might decrease because a wider variety of
firms would be providing them.
Unlike the 1930s, a key concern regarding bank
powers today isthe possibility that banking organi-
zations would shelter additional activities under the
federal safety net. Forthis reason, somehave argued
against expanding the powers of banking organiza-
tions, while others have argued that new powers be
carried out only in separate subsidiaries. Most
observers agree, however, that the type ofcorporate
separability that we have today is not very likely to
insulate the bank from losses ofa nonbank affiliate
in times of stress. 16 Truly effective corporate sepa-
rateness might require completely separate identi-
ties for the bank and nonbank affiliates, separate
boards ofdirectors, and severe limitations on inter-
affiliate transactions. Such an approach might
severely restrict or even eliminate any potential
synergies the consolidated organization otherwise
might enjoy. 17
There is yet another view on the bank powers
problem. Reform ofthe deposit insurance system to
reduce its risk-taking incentives would make it
easier to expand bank powers in response to market
forces. With fewer limitations on bankpowers, there
would be less incentive for financial activity to shift
away from federally supervised institutions.
Expand the Financial Powers afBanks
Along with a program for meaningful insurance
reform, two broadreforms ofbank powers might be
considered. First, we might consider expanding the
financial powers of banks. In other words, banks
mightbe allowed to underwriteandtrade securities,
underwrite and sell insurance, manage mutual
funds, and offer other financially related services.
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This approach would accommodate the trend
towards functional realignment in the provision of
financial services. It also would enhance the effi-
ciency of the financial system by, among other
things, enabling banks both to originate underlying
assets and then to underwrite and sell derivative
securities.
This approach may require increased surveillance
ofthe activities ofthe consolidated enterprise since
it increases a bank's opportunities for risk-taking.
Such surveillance need not be a major stumbling
block, however. In other countries where greater
integration of financial services is allowed, regula-
tors apparently have been able to supervise the
activities of financial conglomerates. 18 Of course,
such supervision may be easier to carry out in
countries where there is only a handful of large
banks.
Expand the Commercial Powers ofBanks
A second general approach to the reform ofbank
powers would be to expand both the financial and
commercial powers ofbanks. This approach would
enable banks to own and control commercial firms
and vice versa. Concerns regarding increased con-
centration of corporate control could be resolved
through ownership limits, as have been established
in West Germany, to prevent banks from exercising
too much influence over the economy.
Once again, however, expanding bank powers in
this way could complicate the assessment of the
risks borne by the deposit insurance system. For
example, the pressure to lend to troubled "house"
firms may increase affiliate banks' risk unless
federal supervisors canevaluate the soundness ofall
inter-affiliate transactions. (Alternatively, bank reg-
ulators could ban all inter-affiliate transactions, but
if the ban were effective, it would severely reduce
the benefits of conglomeration.) Reform of the
deposit insurance system would, in theory, reduce
the problem ofincreased risk. In practice, however,
fully effective reform rests on the ability ofregula-
tors to monitorthe market value ofthe consolidated
enterprise a difficult task, at best.
Given these difficulties, it is debatable just how
far we should proceed in the direction of allowing
banks to affiliate with commercial firms. Oneadvantage of such affiliations would be the reduc-
tionofrisk throughthe conglomerationofdissimilar
activities. However, the operating synergies
between banking and commerce do not appear to be
great. Instead, there is some evidence that commer-
cial firms are seeking banking powers primarily
because they desire access to the payments system
and wish to take advantage of related marketing
synergies. If this were true, one way to resolve the
issue of integrating banking and commerce would
be to grant nondepository firms access only to the
payments system provided they collateralized their
transactions.
The Payments System
The major trends enumerated here bear impor-
tantly on the functioning of the payments system.
Increased financial activity, securitization, and
internationalization of markets presage a growing
payments volume. There is legitimate concern that
these trends may increase both the possibility and
consequences of losses arising from a payments
system malfunction or from the failure of a major
participant in the system. 19
In a payments system that uses the creation and
extinction of credit to facilitate payments activity,
such failures can generate liquidity problems for
participants. With highly interconnected payments
flows that rely on credit, a single failure can cascade
into liquidity problems throughout the payments
network. One ofthe functions ofa central bank, of
course, is to provide liquidity to sound institutions
in such circumstances. However, central bank pay-
ments system policy should not imply protection
against insolvency or even encourage frequent use
ofthe emergency liquidity facility.
The Status Quo
The consequences of maintaining current pay-
ments conventions in light of anticipated growth
trends in the volume ofpayments are worth consid-
ering. The payments system now entails under-
priced intraday credit, delayed settlement, and
access that is limited to depository institutions.
Underpriced intraday credit arises in several
ways. First, the Federal Reserve encourages use of
intraday credit by not charging for daylight over-
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drafts. Although the Fed is charging an implicit
price on very large intraday credit activity as the
result of a policy of limiting daylight overdrafts, it
does not price most intraday Fed credit. Second, the
FederalReserve does not charge for the default risk
itassumesby offering finality of payment on Fed-
wire. Thus, receivers offunds on Fedwire are not a
potential source ofdiscipline in the payment-credit
decision. This distribution ofrisk differs from that
ofprivate networks where the provisional nature of
transactions makes receivers evaluate the credit-
worthiness of payors.
Finally, some argue that there are externalities
associated with payments activity that lead to the
underpricing of a credit associated with payments
even on wholly private networks. In particular, they
argue that individual payments are transacted in
ignorance ofthe burden that would be imposed on
others should that transaction fail. Ifthis view were
correct, private charges for payments credit would
be lower than the social cost ofthat credit. This and
othercauses ofunderpriced payments creditencour-
age the use ofintraday credit that may be too large
from the viewpoint of economic efficiency.
The delayed settlement feature of present day
private payments systems adds to the concerns
raised by underpricing. Delayed settlement
increases the chances that an adverse event will
nullify transactions that have already taken place.
As payments activity grows and the interconnected-
ness ofthe payments system increases, some argue
that the likelihood ofsuch disruptions will increase.
Combined with excessive use of payments system
credit because of underpricing, this additional con-
cern raises the risk of coincident liquidity or sol-
vency problems for participants that could, in tum,
precipitate a general loss ofconfidence in the pay-
ments system.
Although intervention by the central bank should
be able to protect the economy from such liquidity
problems, such intervention is not costless and, if
perfonnedfrequently, couldcreate additional incen-
tives for risk-taking, particularly ifthe intervention
extends beyond providing liquidity to ensuring sol-
vency. Thus, the problem of excessive payments
system risk- like excessive risk-taking in other
facets ofbanking - is a serious concern ofcurrent
payments system policy.The third feature of concern in the current pay-
ments system is access that is limited to depository
institutions. Nonbank institutions have been over-
coming the limitation through thrift and nonbank
bank ownership: In addition, nondepository firms
are using sweep-type arrangements to provide pay-
ments services to their customers. These arrange-
ments, however, may affect the size and timing of
payments activity·in an undesirable way from the
standpoint ofpayments system risk. For these rea-
sons, payments system access is ofincreasing con-
cern whether or not there is a change in explicit
access policy.
Pricing Fed Credit
Further progress toward the pricing or rationing
of intraday Federal Reserve credit would remove a
major stimulus to the overuse of intraday credit,
bothonFedwire and onprivatewholesale networks.
These additional steps should be taken despite
issues raised by Federal Reserve payments queues
and computer malfunctions, although improve-
ments in these areas should be made in conjunction
with pricing efforts.
Ideally, intradaycreditpricing would embody not
only thetimevalue offunds, butalsothevalueofthe
default risk implicitly assumed by the Federal
Reserve in granting finality ofpayment on Fedwire.
This approach would simulatethe disciplineexerted
by receivers of funds in the private intraday credit
market, and reducethedirectcreditriskto whichthe
Federal Reserve System would be exposed.
With a positive price for intraday credit, overall
use of such credit would decline. In the short run,
this decline may retard the growth ofactivities that
have becomereliant on underpriced intraday credit,
such as churning in the securities market and the
corporate cash management process generally. It is
notclear, however, thatthecurrentlevelofpayments
activity (involvingdailyflows of$1 trillionormore)
is efficient, whereas it is clear that the current
system induces inadequate credit evaluation. The
latter increases the risk of payments failure on
privatenetworks, or, alternatively, therisk tothe Fed
on Fedwire.
Pricing Fedwire intraday credit presumably
would push more payments activity into the private
credit market. Although such a shift might increase
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risk in the private market, funds receivers in the
private market do have an incentive to monitor and
control their risk exposure. Private bilateral pay-
ments decisions, however, may not automatically
take·into account the total "social" credit risk
involved. Reduction of this risk requires sur-
veillance by the appropriate regulators and the prin-
cipal participants in private payments networks.
Suchsurveillance may requireminimumparticipant
capital (or liquid reserve) requirements, net debit
limits,orother risk-limiting devices such as those
currently employed by private intraday credit sys-
tems such as CHIPS and Euroclear.
Analogous to charging interest on intraday over-
drafts, interest also should be paid on positive
balances. Symmetry in the treatment ofborrowing
from and lending to the Federal Reserve System
would improve the functioning ofthe private intra-
day credit market. It also would decrease Fedwire
congestion associated with attempts to maintain
minimumrequired reserve balances at the endofthe
day, and would enhance the attractiveness of hold-
ing corporate demand deposits at banks (which also
should be allowed to yield explicit interest).
Real-Time Settlement
In addition to providing better management of
risk in a delayed-settlement environment, an
increased price for intraday credit will encourage a
transition toward "real-time settlement" whereby
both monitoring ofpositions and matching of pay-
ments flows will occur on a continuous basis. A
payments system should bea credit system only ifit
is more efficient to bridge temporal gaps between
the payment and receiptoffunds through borrowing
than through expending resources to make transac-
tions synchronous. Under the current system, bor-
rowing and asynchronous payments are favored.
With costly intraday credit, participants will seek
the means to synchronize transactions and settle
obligations in "real time." Forexample, repayment
of funds borrowed overnight will be more closely
matched in time with funds inflows that reflect
borrowing for the next night. Such operations, if
exactly matched in time, will reduce overdraft
exposure bysubstituting a relatively small nettrans-
fer (the difference between the two borrowings) for
two gross transfers mismatched in time.Real-time settlement is becoming increasingly
feasible as communications and electronic account-
ing technologies advance. Since real-time settle-
ment eliminates, by definition, temporal risk in the
the evolution toward real-time
settlement will contribute significantly to reducing
payments system risk. Many transactions may be
quite costly to settle in real time, ofcourse, and the
will continue to involve credit
extension to some degree. However, as around-the-
clock and global securities trading progresses, the
importance of managing temporal risk will mount,
and real-time payments technology increasingly
will be needed to manage risk economically.
Finally, by resolving theproblemsofunderpriced
intraday credit and delayed settlement, there would
be •less .need to~ontinue. to limit·access to the
payments system. An orderly expansion of pay-
ments system access, in conjunction with these
other reforms, likely would not pose undue risk and
would resolve the problems created by non-deposi-
tory firms exploiting various loopholes in the cur-
rent policy.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
A financial revolution is underway. Already we
see glimpses ofthe new financial world in the forms
of increased securitization, a diminished role for
bank-provided intermediation, functional realign-
ment in and geographic integration of financial
services, and expanded access by nonbank firms to
the payments system. These are trends driven both
by fundamental economic forces and attempts to
circumvent regulation and to exploit government
guarantees.
Many of these changes have not resulted from
explicit policy choices. While most would admit
that a thorough reform of financial regulatory and
legal policy is long overdue, the continuing debate
overjust what changes are necessary apparently has
paralyzed the policymaking process.
Although there are no easy or simple solutions,
the time has come to move forward because failure
to make the needed changes may threaten financial
stability. Three areas are especially in need ofthor-
ough reform: the federal safety net, the payments
system, and bank powers.
The problem with our current deposit
insurance system is that it provides an incentive for
excessive risk-taking, which could propagate
throughout the economy as distinctions between
banks and nonbank firms diminish. Without
changes in the insurance system, the government
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could be left underwriting the risks of an ever-
increasing share of the economy.
Similarly, the implicit government guarantee
behind the payments system may prove to be unsus-
tainable in the face of rapid financial innovation.
Underpriced intraday credit in conjunction with
delayed settlement appears to be a major part ofthe
problem. Without reforms in these areas, expanded
payments system access poses further risks.
Finally, banks are experiencing economic pres-
sures to expand into nontraditional activities. A
majorreason for preventing them from doing so is to
protect the deposit insurance and payments guaran-
tees. However, many observers question whether
the U.S. banking industry will be able to compete
effectively if it continues to be regulated more
stringently than domestic nonbank firms and bank-
ing firms in other countries.
Clearly, market forces for change are posing
serious challenges to the current financial regula-
tory framework and safety net. By reforming the
legal and regulatory framework to accommodate
these forces and to encourage more market disci-
pline of risk-taking, we can move toward a more
efficient and stable financial system. Undoubtedly,
a blend of many of the approaches touched upon
here will be needed to reach these goals.FOOTNOTES
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